St. John's University School of Law

St. John's Law Scholarship Repository
Bankruptcy Research Library

Center for Bankruptcy Studies

2009

United States v. White, 365 B.R. 457
Robert Griswold

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/bankruptcy_research_library
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons
This Research Memorandum is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for Bankruptcy Studies at St.
John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Bankruptcy Research Library by an
authorized administrator of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
selbyc@stjohns.edu.

United States v. White, 365 B.R. 457
Robert Griswold, J.D. Candidate 2010

In U.S. v. White, 365 B.R. 457 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2007), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania addressed the issue of whether the Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”) may setoff the entire pre-petition debt against pre-petition claims that have
been declared exempt, or whether the IRS is only allowed to setoff up to the amount of the
priority claim. The court held that the IRS may setoff the entire debt and is not limited to the
amount of the priority claim.
The proper treatment of the IRS’ setoff right in bankruptcy is unclear because of a
possible conflict between sections 522(c) and section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code. Outside of
bankruptcy, the IRS may normally offset tax overpayments (tax refunds) against a debtor’s
outstanding tax liability. See 26 U.S.C. § 6402(a) (2006). This right is typically protected in
bankruptcy by the operation of section 553, which provides that Title 11 “does not affect any
right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt” that arose before the commencement of the case
against a claim that also arose before the commencement of the case. See 11 U.S.C. § 553
(2006). However, in an effort to ensure that a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding has the ability
make a fresh start, section 522 provides that certain assets may be declared exempt, protecting
them from the reach of creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2006). In order to protect these exempt
assets from creditors, section 522(c) provides that exempt assets may not be “liable” during or
after the bankruptcy proceedings for any debt that arose before the case, with some limited
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exceptions. Id. One of these exceptions “specifically subjects these exemptions to prepetition, priority claims,” White, 365 B.R. at 459, which is why priority debt is not barred from
setoff by section 522.
The source of the conflict is that it is unclear how these two statutes work together
when there is a pre-existing right to setoff against assets the debtor has declared exempt. If the
IRS would have a valid right to offset the debt outside bankruptcy, but the debtor has declared
the overpayment exempt, section 522(c) dictates that the IRS could not take more than the
amount of priority debt. However, section 553 dictates that the bankruptcy code cannot alter
the IRS’ right to setoff. Whether the right of setoff of exempted assets is limited to the amount
of the priority debt or whether it is allowed up to the full amount of overpayment is dependant
on whether the court gives preference to section 553 or to section 522.
In U.S. v. White, the court acknowledged a split of authority regarding whether the IRS’
right to setoff non-priority debt is allowed against exempt assets of the debtor or whether its
right to setoff is limited to the amount of the priority claim, 365 B.R. at 461, but found the
reasoning behind the cases allowing setoff of the entire overpayment more compelling, id. at
463. In White, a debtor owed $8,922.40 to the IRS, $1,780.52 of which was considered
priority debt. Id. The debtor filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy in February of 2004 and claimed
as exempt a $3,148 tax overpayment for the 2003 tax year. Id. The IRS moved to lift the
automatic stay in order to allow it to setoff the entire 2003 overpayment against its pre-petition
tax claim. Id. In the decision appealed from, the Pennsylvania bankruptcy court allowed the
IRS to setoff only to the extent of the priority debt, requiring the remainder of the overpayment
to be returned to the debtor as a tax refund. Id. at 458–59. The district court reversed, holding
that the IRS could setoff the entire 2003 overpayment. Id. at 463.
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The court in White provides a brief overview of the reasoning used by both lines of
cases. The next sections will elaborate on the summaries provided by the court and will more
fully explore the arguments on both sides of the issue. While both lines of cases make
arguments using statutory interpretation, plain meaning and congressional intent, the
arguments favoring setoff are more compelling. After the examination of the two lines of
reasoning, further examination is made of the case In re Gould, a recent decision by the 9th
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Pannell. See Gould v. Gould (In re Gould), No. 05-50292, 2009
WL 465599 (9th Cir. BAP Feb. 11, 2009). The 9th Circuit is the highest court to speak on the
matter and provides further compelling support in favor of setoff. Finally, in conclusion it is
determined that giving preference to setoff over exemption by favoring section 553 over
section 522 is most consistent with the plain meaning of the words, furthers the goals of the
bankruptcy code and is a better approximation of congressional intent.

Decisions favoring Exemption
The majority of courts give section 522 preference over section 553 and therefore allow
setoff only to the extent of the priority debt. When there are mutual obligations that would
normally permit setoff but the debt has been declared exempt, many courts find that there is a
direct conflict between sections 553 and 522, which cannot resolved by looking at the plain
meaning of the statutes. In re Jones, 230 B.R. 875 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1999) (“There is . . . an
apparent conflict between § 522(c) and § 553(a).”). But see In re Kitty Hawk, Inc., 255 B.R. at
427 (suggesting there is no conflict between sections 522 and 553). Because there is no plain
meaning, these courts examine the conflict with tools of statutory interpretation, considers the
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congressional intent as indicated by the legislative history of these sections and examines
relevant public policy considerations.
First, since there is no clear plain meaning, upholding the pre-existing right of setoff is
at the discretion of the court. See In re Tarbuck, 318 B.R. 78, 85 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2004) (“It
is within this court’s discretion whether to permit setoff.”); In re Pace, 257 B.R. at 919
(explaining that section 553’s application ‘‘rests in the discretion of [the] court”); In re
Alexander, 225 B.R. 145, 147 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1998) (stating section 553 is applied at
discretion of the court). These courts argue that section 553 has been construed as being
“permissive in nature, rather than mandatory.” In re Alexander, 225 B.R. at 147. The court is
therefore permitted to use its equitable discretion to determine whether to apply section 553.
In re Pace, 257 B.R. at 919 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2000). Further, these courts would argue that
even in cases where the requirements of setoff are met, the court should not allow the setoff if
it would result in inequity or if it would be against public policy. See FDIC v. Bank of Am.
Nat'l Trust and Sav., 701 F.2d 831, 836–37 (9th Cir.1983).
The second argument used in favor of exemption is based on congressional intent. The
Senate version of section 522 specifically allowed for exempted property to remain liable for
discharged tax debts, but this wording was dropped before the law was enacted. In re
Alexander, 225 B.R. at 150. Courts favoring exemption suggest that this would have provided
a clear answer to the dilemma, and that the purposeful removal of this language indicates a
clear congressional intent that exempt property would not be liable for the payment of
dischargeable tax debts. Id. But see In re Gould 389 B.R. 105, 113 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2008)
(suggesting that the language of the senate version describes a process distinct from setoff,
discussed below).
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Thirdly, courts favoring exemption utilize tools of statutory interpretation to justify
favoring section 522 over section 553. These courts look to the presumption that statutes
should be interpreted in a way that does not leave part of the act meaningless. This means that
when there are two equally plausible interpretations of sections of a statute or act, and one
interpretation would render one portion of the statute meaningless, but the other would give
meaning to both, the latter is preferred. These courts suggest that allowing setoff of exempt
assets would nullify section 522. See, e.g., In re Alexander, 225 B.R. at 149. To favor section
553 over section 522, these courts argue, would leave a debtor without any ability to exempt
assets from reach by any creditor with a pre existing right to offset. This seems to be a
particularly weak argument for two reasons. First, there are five exceptions to section 522
given in the statute itself, but these exceptions do not make the statute meaningless. Second, a
determination of whether a statute is a nullified by an interpretation must be based on whether
it has meaning in any situation rater than whether it has meaning in this specific situation.
Even if section 522 does not protect exempt assets from setoff, it still protects the exempt
assets against any creditor that does not have a valid pre-existing right of setoff. By logic
employed by these courts, any section containing any exception would be held to be a nullity.
A provision that protects exempt assets from all but a small subset of creditors should not be
seen as a nullity.
Finally, courts limiting setoff rights focus on the section 522 policy of providing a fresh
start to debtors declaring bankruptcy by allowing some property to be off limits, ensuring that
the debtor emerges from bankruptcy with the basic means to survive and the ability to make a
fresh start. See White, 365 B.R. at 461. This fresh start policy is at the core of the purpose of
bankruptcy law and should be protected.
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Decisions favoring Setoff
Courts permitting setoff on non-priority debt argue that the plain meaning of section
553 means it should override section 522(c). Section 553 provides that Title 11 “does not
affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt . . .” provided that the debts arose before
the commencement of the case against a claim that also arose before the commencement of the
case. Section 522 is a “section of the code” as described in section 553. Therefore, these
courts reason that “the clear and unambiguous language of [section] 553(a),” In re Kitty Hawk,
Inc., 255 B.R. 424, 427 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000), mandates that no section of the Code,
including section 522(c), should affect the IRS’ pre-existing right to setoff.
Courts favoring setoff use several methods of statutory interpretation to both support
their argument and to counter the arguments made by the courts favoring exemption.
According to the plain meaning of section 522, allowing setoff of exempted debts would not
render either section meaningless or a nullity; section 522 is still effective against any creditor
that does not possess a right to offset the debt. A right of offset has fairly stringent
requirements. It requires a mutuality of parties, mutuality of obligation and for both to have
arisen pre-petition. This means that section 522 is far from a nullity, and instead is effective
against any creditor that does not meet these stringent requirements. See In Re Bourne, 262
B.R. 745 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2001).
A second tool utilized by some courts is a presumption in favor of setoff. Setoff rights
in bankruptcy are “‘generally favored,’ and a presumption in favor of their enforcement
exists.” In re Gould 389 B.R. 105, 113 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting In re De Laurentiis
Ent. Group, Inc., 963 F.2d 1269, 1277 (9th Cir.1992)). Such a presumption favors the
interpretation that setoff should be permitted up to the whole claim.
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Further support for the presumption in favor of setoff is found in section 542(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code, which provides that “an entity that owes a debt that is property of the estate .
. . shall pay such debt . . . except to the extent that such debt may be offset under section 553 of
this title.” 11 U.S.C. 542(b) (2006). This provision does not directly address the address the
issue at hand because exempt property is not necessarily “property of the estate” and thus may
not fall under section 542. See White, 365 B.R. at 462.
The decisions favoring setoff utilize legislative history for two purposes. First, these
courts challenge the assertion made by courts favoring exemption that there is a clear
congressional intent based on the elimination of portions of the Senate version of section 522.
Second, these courts look to legislative history surrounding section 553 for support that
congress favored setoff over exemption.
First, courts favoring setoff indicate that the legislative history to section 522 does not
indicate any congressional intent regarding the issue of exception verses setoff. Although the
legislative history indicated that a provision that specifically allowed for exempted property to
remain liable for discharged tax debts was removed from the Senate version of section 522, the
provision and surrounding discussion addressed debts in general and did not specifically
mention setoff rights. The collection a unilateral debt is different than the offset of a mutual
obligation and even clear congressional intent on the former does not mean that Congress also
meant to address the latter or to influence the contest between sections 553 and 522. See In re
Gould 389 B.R. at 123.
Even if the provision had been on point, the mere failure to enact a provision found in a
preliminary version is not a clear indication of congressional intent. The courts favoring setoff
suggest that Congress did not prohibit the setoff of exempt property, and thus the removal of
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the restriction is not a clear indication of congressional intent. In re Martinez, 258 B.R. at 367.
There is only so much that can be made out of congressional inaction. While Congress did not
enact the version that that would have explicitly allowed exempt property to remain liable for
discharged taxes, the fact that this specific language was omitted is not conclusive evidence
that congress intended the opposite. The court in Martinez suggests that where a plain
meaning is present it trumps legislative history, which provides only a “cloudy” view of
congressional intent. Id.
Second, the legislative history of § 553 “supports a reading giving general primacy to
setoffs.” U.S. v. White, 365 B.R. 457, 462 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2007). The history here reiterates
the plain meaning of section 553; nothing in the bankruptcy code should affect a creditor’s preexisting right to setoff mutual debt. This legislative history lends further support to a
presumption in favor of setoff.
While acknowledging that a fresh start is an important goal of bankruptcy courts, courts
in favor of setoff note that there are many other exceptions to the debtor’s exemption rights and
that the fresh start policy is “not always paramount and is often subordinated to other social
and economic concerns and objectives.” See In re Bourne, 262 B.R. at 757. The Bankruptcy
Code reflects a balance between the fresh start for the debtor and providing a fair distribution
of assets to creditors, and section 553 demonstrates that the fresh start policy does not “trump
the common law rights of creditors of setoff of mutual debts.” In re Martinez, 258 B.R. at 367.

In re Gould
A few months after White was decided, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of California decided In re Gould, 385 B.R. 713 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2008). In Re Gould
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was decided in favor of exemption as taking precedence over setoff, placing it at odds with
White. Subsequently, however, In re Gould was withdrawn and amended. It was re-issued two
months later, but it still favored exemption over setoff. However, on February 11, the
Bankruptcy Appellate Pannell of the Ninth Circuit overruled the district court, holding that the
specific facts of the case did not lead to a conflict between section 553 and 522. See Gould v.
Gould (In re Gould), No. 05-50292, 2009 WL 465599, at *8 (9th Cir. BAP Feb. 11, 2009).
The Ninth Circuit goes on to suggest in dicta that in a case where a conflict between 553 and
522 does arise, 553 would be given preference. Doing so they present three further arguments
not found in the other cases favoring setoff.
The first argument used is the presumption against interpretations that nullify sections
of a statute. Section 553 does not create a right of setoff; it merely protects that right in
bankruptcy when it is pre-existing. Id at *9. If section 553 is taken to mean that the right is
protected at the discretion of the court then it has no meaning. It would merely suggest that the
court should allow a right that already exists if it wants to. See id.
The second argument presented by the Ninth Circuit in In re Gould is that the language
of section 553 is itself an indication of congressional intent that it controls. It is very sweeping
language, and it shows that Congress intended to preserve the long-standing tradition of
favoring exemption rights. See id.
Finally, the court provides another policy consideration in favor of setoff. If courts
favor exemption over setoff, then creditors who have a right of setoff will need to challenge
exemption filings in order to protect their interests. This would lead to excess litigation over
exemptions that may have gone through unchallenged if creditors with a setoff right was not
forced to challenge. See id.
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Conclusion
Both lines of cases present comprehensive arguments based on judicial precedent,
statutory interpretation, congressional intent and public policy. Yet the arguments in favor of
setoff seem distinctly stronger and more compelling. Both lines of cases use a rule against
nullification, but it seems that rule 522 would still have significant meaning even if it were not
effective against creditors with a right of setoff. On the other hand, rule 553 preserves a right,
and if it were held to be preserved merely at the discretion of the court, then section 553 may
as well not have been included as the result would be the same.
Many courts will not look at congressional intent if the plain text o the statute is clear.
And it seems to several courts that the working of the two statutes is clear. Even if it were
unclear enough that congressional intent and legislative history are appropriate, there is
evidence of congressional intent going both ways. Some intent may be drawn from the act of
removing language that may have offered guidance in the mater from the senate version of the
bill, but there is dispute as to the relevance of the removed language in this dispute. Further,
intent can be drawn in favor of setoff by a history of interpretation favoring setoff, the broad
language of section 553 and even the legislative history of section 553 itself.
Both sides also claim compelling policy arguments. Bankruptcy is about providing a
fresh start to debtors while providing some relief to creditors. The courts favoring exemption
emphasize the fresh start policy whereas those favoring setoff emphasize relief to creditors.
On top of this is that the practical considerations, and the Ninth Circuit at least suggests that
setoff would result in greater judicial efficiency through less challenges to exemptions when
creditors possess a right of setoff.
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Although the line of cases favoring exemption is the majority rule, it seems clear that
there is a definite trend away from the majority rule favoring exemption and towards the rule
favoring setoff, which will now likely be further boosted by a favorable ruling by the Ninth
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Pannell.
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